## Introduction/Notes

### Why Learn Conditionality?

Take notes here…

#### 1. It’s a stock issue

#### 2. It’s a potential path to victory

#### 3. It’s an effective deterrent

#### 4. A warning

### History of Conditionality

Take notes here…

#### 1. The Paradigm Wars — Hypothesis Testing vs. Policymaking

#### 2. The Continuing Controversy

#### 3. Policymaking’s Embrace of Conditionality

#### 4. Evolution since 2000

### Mastering Conditionality Debates

Take notes here…

#### 1. Prepare thoroughly.

#### 2. Craft provable arguments.

#### 3. Debate specific interpretations.

#### 4. Design winning strategies.

#### 5. Clearly explain arguments.

#### 6. Debate the role of the judge/ballot.

#### 7. Assess strategic interactions.

#### 8. Compare impacts and internal links.

#### 9. Make choices.

#### 10. Realistically assess the larger context.

## Background Information

### Ten Foundational Questions

1. What effect does conditionality have on the *number* of arguments introduced in *a single debate*?

2. What effect does conditionality have on the *nature* of arguments introduced in *a single debate*?

3. What effect does conditionality have on the *number* of arguments introduced over *an entire debate season*?

4. What effect does conditionality have on the *nature* of arguments introduced over *an entire debate season*?

5. What effect do these incentives have on research and preparation practices?

6. What effect does conditionality have on the *breadth* of discussion of arguments in *a single debate*?

7. What effect does conditionality have on the *depth* of discussion of arguments in *a single debate*?

8. What effect does conditionality have on the *breadth* of discussion of arguments over *an entire debate season*?

9. What effect does conditionality have on the *depth* of discussion of arguments over *an entire debate season*?

10. What constitutes a rigorous “test” of the affirmative and why is such a test valuable?

### The Spectrum of Interpretations

The following is a list of interpretations in relative order from least limiting to the negative to most limiting to the negative.

1. Classic Unconstrained Conditionality — the neg can introduce an unlimited number of conditional advocacies and the status quo always remains a logical option

2. Arbitrarily Limited/Negotiated Conditionality — the neg can introduce a specified number of conditional advocacies (2, 3, etc.) and the status quo always remains a logical option; sometimes there is also an additional stipulation about contradictions or cross-applications (“we get three conditional options but can’t contradict and we won’t cross-apply from one to another”)

3. Ideological Conditionality (“One CP, One K”) — the neg can introduce one conditional counterplan and one conditional critique and the status quo always remains a logical option

4. Unconstrained Dispositionality — the neg can introduce an unlimited number of dispositional advocacies; if the affirmative concedes the “link” (that the advocacy is competitive) to one of them, the neg must defend that advocacy and may not revert to defending the status quo

5. Logical Limited Conditionality — the neg can introduce one conditional advocacy and the status quo always remains a logical option

6. Constrained Dispositionality — the neg can introduce one dispositional advocacy; if the affirmative concedes the “link” (that the advocacy is competitive), the neg must defend that advocacy and may not revert to defending the status quo

7. Unconditionality/Pre-Round Conditionality — the neg must decide before the debate whether to defend the status quo or a single unconditional advocacy

### Clarifying “Dispositionality”

Dispositionality is no longer a popular argument in debate. However, there remains the misconception that dispositionality is “the same as conditionality” because the negative can add planks to its counterplans in order to force the affirmative to permute them. This is incorrect.

Dispositionality relies on the opportunity cost model of counterplans. This model views counterplans as disadvantages to the plan; by choosing the plan, the judge foregoes the opportunity to pass only the counterplan (but not the plan). Under this model, a two-plank counterplan is like a disadvantage with two links. If the affirmative says "no link" to one of two links to a disadvantage and then impact turns the disadvantage, the negative can't kick the disadvantage by conceding that link #1 doesn't link to the plan (because link #2 still does).

For example, assume that the affirmative read the Taiwan Grand Bargain case and the negative read the following Primacy Disadvantage:

A. Uniqueness: the U.S. will retain East Asian primacy unless it gives up Taiwan.

B. Link:

1. The plan undermines U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea, destroying U.S. East Asian primacy.

2. The plan increases Chinese expansionism, destroying U.S. East Asian primacy.

C. Impact: U.S. East Asian primacy is good because it prevents great power wars.

In the 2AC, assume that the affirmative made only the following two arguments:

1. No link to “Chinese expansionism” — China won’t pursue territorial expansion beyond Taiwan.

2. Turn: the breakdown of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korean alliances is good because those alliances entangle the U.S. into conflicts and because independent Japanese and South Korean nuclear capabilities would reduce the risk of East Asian war.

In the 2NC, assume the negative says the following: “We're not going for the disad. Concede 2AC #1 — China won’t be expansionist even after they control Taiwan. This takes out the link to the disadvantage.”

In the 1AR, assume the affirmative says the following: “Extend that the breakdown of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korean alliances is good because it reduces the risk that the U.S. will be drawn into a war and because independent Japanese and South Korean nuclear capabilities would reduce the risk of great power war in East Asia. We conceded that our plan undermines these alliances. While the neg is right that there is no link to expansionism, they are wrong that there is no link to alliances. ‘Alliances bad’ is an advantage to the aff.”

In this hypothetical, the affirmative is correct. The primacy disadvantage is “one disadvantage” in the same way that a multi-plank counterplan is “one counterplan.” Just as there can be “no link” to part of a disadvantage, there can be “no link” to part of a counterplan.

When debating a dispositional counterplan with two planks, the affirmative should permute to do the plan and the plank of the counterplan that the negative has included to force the affirmative to permute it — but not the plank of the counterplan that the affirmative wants to force the negative to extend.

### Conditionality Threads (Circa 2003)

**Affirmative**

Hurts advocacy skills — no good advocate would simultaneously defend inconsistent positions. Shifting from one position to another hurts credibility. This is important because the purpose of debate is to train us to be effective advocates.

Argumentative Irresponsibility — allowing teams to jettison arguments without cost lowers the bar for introduction. This allows repugnant positions to be expressed. It’s not what they did, it’s what they justify.

Time and strategy skew — the introduction of too many arguments makes it too difficult for the affirmative to respond at all, much less with our best arguments. This decreases clash and depth of discussion. Depth outweighs breadth — it’s better to learn a lot about a few things than a little about a lot of things.

**Negative**

Neg flex — we need to test the aff from multiple angles. It’s hard to be neg because our ground is reactive and they get to speak first and last.

2AC strategic thinking — conditionality challenges the aff to make only their best arguments. Without conditionality, we’re an easy target and it’s too easy to be aff.

Best policy option — testing from multiple angles ensures we find the best policy. This is more important than “advocacy skills” or “argumentative responsibility” because it’s the purpose of debate.

Most logical — the status quo is always a logical choice. Without conditionality, the judge might be stuck in an illogical position and forced to choose between two bad options. Logic is important because it underlies all decision-making contexts.

Negation theory — our only job is to negate. Our arguments don’t contradict because they all agree that the judge should vote negative.

Time and strategy skews are inevitable — we’ll read lots of disads and topicality arguments and some teams are faster than others.

Hard debate is good debate — don’t vote against us unless we make debate impossible.

### Conditionality Threads (Circa 2016)

**Affirmative**

Unproductive argument culture — conditionality incentivizes *coverage* over *engagement*. The goal is for the aff to have less time to respond so that they drop something or undercover something. The aff can cope with this strategy only by doing the same thing to the neg — lots of short arguments whose aim is to deprive the neg of a chance to respond. This results in late-breaking debates with very little meaningful clash. The *telos* of debate should be well-prepared engagement, not strategic ambiguity and tactical evasion.

Removes barrier to entry — conditionality lowers the bar for what gets included in the 1NC. Throwing in a K or a second CP is a no-risk option when you know you can kick it at any time. This is how bad arguments survive in debate.

Information overload — conditionality leads to the introduction of too much content into a time-constrained debate. While it is possible to process a lot of information about a single issue or point of comparison in a single debate, it is not possible to process a lot of information about many issues or points of comparison during the same debate. Debaters will always say the same number of words, but it’s a question of the complexity of the game board on which those words are expressed.

Ideological extremism — conditionality encourages the neg to seek extremist positions on either side of the aff (the neg’s “box-in” argument). This is bad because it discourages middle-middle debates between moderate positions. Without conditionality, there’s less incentive to search of the extremes because you only get one option.

Culture of contradiction — conditionality makes it okay to contradict oneself (because “multiple worlds”). Working through contradictions is important, but this needs to occur before the arguments are presented. Throwing multiple contradictory arguments at the wall and seeing what sticks isn’t “working through contradictions,” it’s uninformed and unproductive argumentation.

Multiple debates solve their offense — see block title below.

Pre-round analysis best model — most of debate’s educational value occurs before the debate. This is also when most of the “testing” of arguments occurs. Defenses of conditionality overestimate the value of the in-round back-and-forth as a platform for learning things or testing arguments.

The judge is a norm-setter — the role of the judge is to communicate their opinion about best practices, not just to play “referee.” Judges are educators that can’t sit on the sidelines while theory battles are being waged.

**Negative**

Argument innovation — because debaters are risk averse, they will rarely introduce new positions into a debate unless they are given a fallback option (via conditionality).

Information processing — the world overloads us with information all the time, and conditionality helps us develop coping strategies.

Ideological polarization & box-in — introducing two conditional arguments can box the affirmative in, forcing them to defend their plan and not just the plan’s ideology. Health care example: Obama defended Obamacare vs. the “Socialize Medicine” CP and the “Get Gov’t Out of Health Care” CP. When faced with just the former, he could have said “It’s bad to have a big government role in health care.” When faced with just the former, he could have said “Free market solutions to health care fail.” When faced with both at the same time, he needed to say “Total nationalization of health care is bad, but the government does need to have a role because free market solutions fail.”

Gear-switching & negotiation skills — there is value in the in-round back-and-forth between positions. Being able to change gears and defend different positions over the course of a debate teaches valuable negotiation and decision-making skills. Deciding what to go for is a useful skill.

Pedagogy of paradox — working through contradictions is educationally valuable. It’s hard, but the aff *can* find ways to exploit tension between arguments. Challenging the aff to do so instead of protecting the aff from being in that position is more pedagogically productive.

Status quo always a logical option — the judge should never be forced to choose between two bad options when doing nothing is a possibility.

Diminishing marginal utility — the introduction of each additional advocacy has less and less strategic value for the negative.

Interplay of arguments best model — pre-tournament and pre-round research and preparation are valuable, but so is the in-round interplay of arguments.

The judge is a referee — the role of the judge isn’t to establish norms but to referee theory violations. Otherwise, there is too much incentive to go for theory and too many debates will become referendums on how the judge feels about theory practices.

### The “Multiple Debates” Challenge for the Neg

The negative needs to craft their defenses of conditionality so as to defeat the following argument:

“Testing” the affirmative is important, but this test occurs throughout the year, not in any particular debate. Students conduct pre-season and pre-tournament research in order to test the viability of resolutional action in general and the plan in particular over the course of the season.

The negative arguments presented in any singular debate are not intended to be a complete test of the desirability of the plan—time limits would ensure that this vision of "testing the aff" produces inaccurate and incomplete knowledge.

Pre-round conditionality as part of a season-long dialectical process is a superior model: in any given debate the negative tests a particular part of the affirmative or tests the affirmative from a particular perspective and the sum total of all these individual debates constitutes a rigorous test of the entire affirmative.

Premises of this argument:

1. The proper lens for assessing debate practices is the complete season, not the individual round. The “breadth” and “depth” of education accumulates over the course of the season. Each individual round is only part of an overall learning process.
2. More rigorous, in-depth “testing” of the affirmative within a single round is uniquely valuable. A series of in-depth debates produces more overall educational value than a series of broad debates. Five in-depth debates over different issues achieve similar breadth to five shallow debates with a diversity of issues, but the series of in-depth debaters secure much greater overall educational value than the series of shallow ones.

### Versions The Aff Should Prepare

1. One conditional counterplan bad.

2. One conditional critique bad.

3. Two conditional counterplans bad.

4. Two conditional critiques bad.

5. One conditional counterplan and one conditional critique bad.

6. Extreme conditionality bad (three or more).

7. Contradictory conditional positions bad.

8. Two conditional frameworks bad.

### Versions The Neg Should Prepare

**Versus “policy” affirmatives:**

1. One conditional counterplan good.

2. One conditional critique good.

3. Two conditional counterplans good.

4. Two conditional critiques good.

5. Extreme conditionality good (three or more).

6. Contradictory conditional positions good.

7. Two conditional frameworks good.

**Versus “non-policy” affirmatives:**

1. One conditional counterplan/critique good.

2. Two conditional counterplans/critiques good.

3. Conditional Topicality/Framework good.

4. Contradiction between Topicality/Framework and counterplan/critique good.

5. Answer To: “conditional ethics.”

6. Answer To: “conditional whiteness.”

## Activities/Exercises

### Interpretation Comparisons

Instructions: For each set of interpretations, list the unique arguments that each side can make in support of their interpretation.

1. Unconditionality/Pre-Round Conditionality vs. Classic Unconstrained Conditionality

2. Logical Limited Conditionality vs. Classic Unconstrained Conditionality

3. Dispositionality vs. Classic Unconstrained Conditionality

4. Unconditionality/Pre-Round Conditionality vs. Ideological Conditionality (one each)

5. Dispositionality vs. Ideological Conditionality (one each)

### Argument Comparisons

For each set of arguments, prepare comparison statements (four-to-five sentences) supporting each side.

#1: “Conditionality is bad because it incentivizes the introduction of unproductive, unfair positions like cheating counterplans” vs. “Conditionality is good because it is most consistent with a model of logical decision-making.”

#2: “Conditionality is bad because it discourages in-depth engagement of arguments” vs. “Conditionality is good because it forces the affirmative to confront an ideologically diverse set of arguments.”

#3: “The judge should use their ballot to support the creation of norms for argumentation practices” vs. “The judge’s role is to referee theory crimes, not to socially engineer community practices.”

### Evidence Analysis and Application

For each piece of evidence presented in the “Evidence” hat, identify:

1. How the evidence can be used to support the affirmative’s position on conditionality (either generally or specifically).

2. How the evidence can be used to support the negative’s position on conditionality (either generally or specifically).

3. Whether you think the evidence is better for the affirmative position or the negative position. Explain why.

### GFCA State Final Round Analysis

The final round of the 2013 GFCA (Georgia) State Tournament was decided on conditionality. The negative from Chattahoochee defeated the affirmative from Pace Academy on a 2-1 decision.

**The 2AC** said that multiple conditional options is a voting issue because:

* skews 2AC strategy
* justifies contradictions
* one conditional option solves offense
* no judge kick – undermines comparative impact calc

**The 2NC** responded with the following (exact block from Viveth's speech document):

Our interpretation is that we get 2 conditional advocacies in 2 frameworks. This solves your offense- the fact that they are in different frameworks means the aff has a broad range of offense

This interpretation is best—

a. Neg flex-we need multiple vantage points to challenge the aff in every round and find the best policy option

b. Prevents ideological extremisn – defending against both sides forces a defense of the plan not the plan’s idedology – best for nuanced dicison making – most decision’s aren’t yes / no but finding the best balance.

C. Aff Burden– The aff must defend all the 1AC- this is justified through aff side bias – first/last speech and infinite prep – we must test the critical and policy aspects of the plan – they are both grounded in the 1ac which makes them predictable. Having a defense of federal planning solves all of your offense.

D. Info Process good – debaters are risk averse – linear impact – 2AC interprets different forms of education good and process the decision on which arguments to read is critical to developing affirmative, real world critical thinking which solves their education claims.

Logic – the status quo should always be an option

No Skews – they’re inevitable – perms, speed, DAs, T violations, reactionary 2ARs and neg burden to debate massive number of affs make shallow debates inevitable.

No Contradictions – you can concede double turns and take out neg offense -- our positions are consisitant – USFG planning / action bad – reject arg not team.

One Advocacy fails – all of our offense is a DA to it.

THERE IS A COST TO EVERY OPTION – Marginal Utility games – function of multiple CPs places a limit because they reach a point of dimishing returns making argumentative development possible.

Substaintive crowdout bad – reject arg not team – stick us to both

**The 1AR** responded with the following arguments:

* VI - education - less rigorous examination
* minimizes 2ac offense
* can’t make cross-apps
* k2 critical thinking
* arg interactions not understood
* one option better for depth
* don't prefer neg flex - disads and t checks
* our interp solves ideological extremism
* politics and security K - still allow nuance
* no aff burden - reject team
* info processing not a reason for condo - inevitable, no impact
* it’s a question of strategy skew – irreparable damage
* aff can't generate offense
* they justify contradictions
* capitalism K and a CP that says increase petro taxes
* no unique offense tied to their interpretation

The 2NR and 2AR were recorded. Videos can be downloaded from: <https://www.mediafire.com/folder/qhwsqndq3lw1a/2013_GFCA_State_Tournament_Final_Round>.

Your task is to flow the 2AC through 1AR (based on the above record of the debate). Students will then listen to the 2NR and 2AR. Students will flow those speeches and render a decision. Once decisions have been made, we will discuss the debate and students’ reasons for decision.

### Conditionality Mini-Debates

The goal of these exercises is to simulate a conditionality debate from 2AC through 2AR.

The 2AC introduces a “conditionality bad” argument, the 2NC responds to it, the 1AR extends the objection, the 2NR replies, and the 2AR goes for conditionality.

For the purposes of the exercise, assume that the 1AC was Taiwan Grand Bargain. The 1NC included the Security Critique, the Strategic Clarity CP, the Alliance Credibility DA, and the Chinese Expansionism DA. Both the K and CP were read conditionally.

2As should be affirmative and 2Ns should be negative. Both debaters have 2 minutes of prep time.

**Format #1 — Short/Typical**

2AC — :15

2NC — :45

1AR — :30

2NR — :45

2AR — 2:30

**Format #2 — Longer**

2AC — :15

2NC — :45

1AR — 1:00

2NR — 1:00

2AR — 3:00

## Helpful Evidence

### Ideological Flexibility

#### Cocooning prevents adequate scrutiny. Testing ideas against opinions from all sides of the political spectrum is crucial to determining the best arguments.

Barone 12 — Michael Barone, Senior Political Analyst for the *Washington Examiner*, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, contributor to Fox News, 2012 (“Cocooned Liberals Are Unprepared for Political Debate,” *TownHall.com*, May 24th, Available Online at http://townhall.com/columnists/michaelbarone/2012/05/24/cocooned\_liberals\_are\_unprepared\_for\_political\_debate/page/full/, Accessed 07-15-2012)

It's comfortable living in a cocoon – associating only with those who share your views, reading journalism and watching news that only reinforces them, avoiding those on the other side of the cultural divide.

Liberals have been doing this for a long time. In 1972, the movie critic Pauline Kael said it was odd that Richard Nixon was winning the election, because everyone she knew was for George McGovern.

Kael wasn't clueless about the rest of America. She was just observing that her own social circle was politically parochial.

The rest of us have increasingly sought out comfortable cocoons, too. Journalist Bill Bishop, who lives in an Austin, Texas, neighborhood whose politics resemble Kael's, started looking at national data.

It inspired him to write his 2009 book "The Big Sort," which describes how Americans since the 1970s have increasingly sorted themselves out, moving to places where almost everybody shares their cultural orientation and political preference – and the others keep quiet about theirs.

Thus professionals with a choice of where to make their livings head for the San Francisco Bay Area if they're liberal and for the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex (they really do call it that) if they're conservative. Over the years the Bay Area becomes more liberal and the Metroplex more conservative.

But cocooning has an asymmetrical effect on liberals and conservatives. Even in a cocoon, conservatives cannot avoid liberal mainstream media, liberal Hollywood entertainment and, these days, the liberal Obama administration.

They're made uncomfortably aware of the arguments of those on the other side. Which gives them an advantage in fashioning their own responses.

Liberals can protect themselves better against assaults from outside their cocoon. They can stay out of megachurches and make sure their remote controls never click on Fox News. They can stay off the AM radio dial so they will never hear Rush Limbaugh.

The problem is that this leaves them unprepared to make the best case for their side in public debate. They are too often not aware of holes in arguments that sound plausible when bandied between confreres entirely disposed to agree.

We have seen how this works on some issues this year.

Take the arguments developed by professor Randy Barnett of Georgetown Law that Obamacare's mandate to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. Some liberal scholars like Jack Balkin of Yale have addressed them with counterarguments of their own.

But liberal politicians and Eric Holder's Justice Department remained clueless about them. Speaker Nancy Pelosi, asked whether Obamacare was unconstitutional, could only gasp: "Are you serious? Are you serious?"

In March, after the Supreme Court heard extended oral argument on the case, CNN's Jeffrey Toobin was clearly flabbergasted that a majority of justices seemed to take the case against Obamacare's constitutionality very seriously indeed.

Liberals better informed about the other side's case might have drafted the legislation in a way to avoid this controversy. But nothing they heard in their cocoon alerted them to the danger.

#### Ideological flexibility is the *lynchpin* of democratic deliberation. Introducing disjunction and ambivalence is a virtue, not a vice.

Hanson and Marcus 10 — Russell L. Hanson, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, and George E. Marcus, Professor of Political Science at Williams College, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University, 2010 (“Introduction: The Practice of Democratic Theory,” *Reconsidering the Democratic Public*, Edited by George E. Marcus and Russell L. Hanson, Published by Penn State Press, ISBN 0271042923, p. 14-15)

Hence, for citizens to engage in deliberation, they must tolerate ambiguity and appreciate contradiction without losing sight of the necessity for action. Doctrinaire thinking upsets democratic deliberation among people with different ideas about the proper course of collective action. As Marcus (1988) argues, accommodation is possible only when people are not rigidly committed to their opinions; a certain amount of ideological flexibility is necessary before compromise occurs. In her contribution to this volume, Jennifer Hochschild identifies two sources of ideological flexibility: disjunction, which arises when a person is uncertain about the applicability of a principle of justice to different areas of social life, and ambivalence, which occurs when an individual holds contradictory beliefs about a single issue.

Either disjunction or ambivalence can lead to political paralysis. People who are committed to equality in politics may not be egalitarian when it comes to economics; they are likely to feel conflict when confronted by questions at the boundary of the two spheres of life, for example, questions of redistributive policy. Similarly, people who are ambivalent may approach a political issue and see that it serves one of their cherished values, say liberty, but not another, say justice. They may be uncertain about where they stand, and so they may not act. This inaction is not a sign of come incapacity for politics; it is evidence of a capacity for deliberating about complex issues (just as self-censorship can sometimes be the result of deliberation).

Moreover, some of Hochshild's subjects reacted to their feelings of disjunction and ambivalence in ways that seem transformative. They [end page 15] tried to resolve their uncertainty by absorbing new information, seeking higher-order values capable of relaxing the tensions of disjunction and ambivalence, and even creating new identities out of their experiences. In so doing, these respondents proved their capacity for internal deliberation of a sort that both precedes and anticipates the "government by discussion" that is the essence of democratic communication. Consequently, the prevalence of disjunction and ambivalence among American citizens is a hopeful sign for democrats interested in the peaceful reconciliation of differences in the citizenry.

An openness to different points of view, and a willingness to submit those differences to the court of public opinion, helps explain the appeal of liberal democratic theory, which Donald Moon construes as an effort to show how people who disagree on important and enduring questions regarding the ends and purposes of life can nevertheless come to live together under rules that all accept. Put this way, the skills required of citizens are manifestly not those identified by researchers who stress the capacity for abstract thinking and ideological consistency. Rather, the requisite virtues include moderation, tolerance, a capacity for coping with disjunction and ambivalence, and a willingness to explore problematic issues with fellow citizens—all of which suggests that democratic citizens must be more like foxes than the hedgehogs of political philosophy and democratic revisionism.

#### Challenging *“my side” reasoning* is crucial to overcome polarization.

Nisbet and Scheufele 12 — Matthew C. Nisbet, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of the Climate Shift Project at American University, Visiting Shorenstein Fellow in Press, Politics, and Public Policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and Dietram A. Scheufele, John E. Ross Chair in Science Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Co-PI of the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University, 2012 (“The Polarization Paradox: Why Hyperpartisanship Strengthens Conservatism and Undermines Liberalism,” The Breakthrough Institute, Summer, Available Online at http://thebreakthrough.org/journal/issue-3/the-polarization-paradox/, Accessed 07-23-2013)

In general, higher levels of education and political engagement turn out to be no defense against ideological tribalism. Indeed, the opposite is the case. The most politically attentive and knowledgeable Americans tend to be the most partisan and polarized.3As political leaders have increasingly packaged almost every issue in terms of clearly defined ideological differences, party labels have become brand names, each standing for a distinct set of conservative or liberal positions.4 The highly educated and politically attentive are the most polarized because they are better at recognizing these ideological labels, more likely to react to these cues in ideologically consistent ways, and more skilled at offering arguments to support their initial gut responses.5

The implication, warns social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, is that the best-educated partisans excel at "my side" reasoning but often fail at critical self-reflection. "Smart people make really good lawyers and press secretaries, but they are no better than others at finding reasons on the other side," he notes.6

#### Ideological consistency prevents gear switching — key to compromise and democratic deliberation.

van Zuylen-Wood 12 — Simon van Zuylen-Wood, Writer for Philadelphia Magazine*,* former writer for the New Republic and the Washington Monthly,2012 (“In Defense of Flip-Flopping,” *Political Animal*—a *Washington Monthly* blog, October 28th, Available Online at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2012\_10/in\_defense\_of\_flipflopping040786.php, Accessed 07-22-2013)

There’s another reason the strategy is a foolish one. Hypocrisy in politics is not only inevitable, but a very necessary evil. To condemn it as a high political crime is to ignore the virtues of ideological malleability. Cass Sunstein, whose post at OMB consisted of high-level cost-benefit analysis, rather than doctrinaire policy-making, praised hypocrisy in a recent column.

In politics, turncoats make sensible compromises possible. If Democrats and Republicans are sharply divided on a question of economic policy, and no one is willing to break ranks, an agreement might be unachievable… Turncoats also break down echo chambers. If conservatives or liberals are listening only to those on their side, they tend to become more confident, more unified and more extreme.

Nixon went to China, Clinton enacted welfare reform, Roberts upheld Obamacare, as Sunstein writes. If the past is any indication, his party will eventually come around to Roberts’s way of thinking, as with Nixon and Clinton, after their supposed heresies. Few castigate Obama now for flipping on the individuate mandate, a policy he vehemently opposed (for conservative reasons) in his primary fight with Hillary Clinton. Moreover, Obama, whose entire 2008 candidacy was based on finding middle ground, demonstrates the necessity not only of embracing flexibility in our politicians, but in practicing it ourselves. Those progressives who still condemn Democrats for giving up on a public option to his health care law, for instance, are interested less in political process—the art of the possible—than in political revolution. Indeed, historian Martin Jay wrote in 2010, after candidates ‘etch-a-sketch’ out of their primary campaigns, “we give them a pass because we know that a genuine consensus based on rational deliberation is highly unlikely, and yet democratic politics requires building a winning coalition…truth-telling is not always the best policy in even the most democratic of political contexts.”

There’s something not only political unfeasible, but morally worrisome about demanding complete ideological coherence from our candidates. The capacity to switch gears reflects the ability to make clear-headed, rather than doctrinaire, judgments. “The ‘big truth’ - ‘the absolute, univocal truth, which silences those who disagree with it and abruptly terminates discussion’,” wrote NYU political theorist Jeremy Waldron in a 2011 review of Jay’s book The Virtues of Mendacity in the London Review of Books “may be as oppressive and inimical to human freedom, plurality, and the vigour of debate as the ‘big lie.’” Political math aside, we’d rather have Romney tack to the center than hang back with the ideologically pure Tea Party puritans, right?

#### Polarization to extreme positions makes rational debate impossible.

Little 12 — Daniel Little, Chancellor and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, Associate Faculty for the Institute for Social Research and the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Harvard University, 2012 (“Polarization of American politics,” *Understanding Society*, July 7th, Available Online at http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2012/07/polarization-of-american-politics.html, Accessed 07-23-2013)

If anything seems self-evident about recent American politics, it is the fact that our discourse and policy debates have become more polarized. Commentators and politicians seem to have moved to more extreme positions over time so that bipartisanship and compromise are all but impossible. As for rational, honest and fact-based debate about policies like taxes, healthcare, or Social Security in the Congress – forget it. Instead we have strident conspiracy theories, ignorant birthers with funny hair, and hateful shrieking about the President – all intended, presumably, to whip up the faithful.

#### Polarization with extreme positions benefits the Right.

Nisbet and Scheufele 12 — Matthew C. Nisbet, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of the Climate Shift Project at American University, Visiting Shorenstein Fellow in Press, Politics, and Public Policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and Dietram A. Scheufele, John E. Ross Chair in Science Communication at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Co-PI of the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University, 2012 (“The Polarization Paradox: Why Hyperpartisanship Strengthens Conservatism and Undermines Liberalism,” The Breakthrough Institute, Summer, Available Online at http://thebreakthrough.org/journal/issue-3/the-polarization-paradox/, Accessed 07-23-2013)

Increasingly, the art of governing and compromise has been replaced by a culture of constant campaigning and relentless negativity, as political leaders prioritize short-term electoral ambitions and small-scale policy fights. Meanwhile, public confidence in government sinks ever lower, as problems such as risky budget deficits, record levels of poverty and inequality, and a dangerous reliance on dirty energy sources go unaddressed.

As liberals, we tell a one-sided story about the complex causes of America's political paralysis. We blame the conservative movement, Fox News, libertarian billionaires, and the "do nothing" Republicans in Congress. Much of this story is true. While both parties have moved toward their ideological poles, the stronger rightward shift of the GOP accounts for much of the increase in polarization.

But there is plenty of blame to go around. Over the past decade, liberals have become more like conservatives, adopting a win-at-all-costs commitment to policy debates and elections. In doing so, liberals have built their own message machine comprised of think tanks, media watchdogs, mega-donor networks, and purposively designed echo chambers that rally strong partisans while demonizing the other side.

The inclination to fight fire with fire is understandable. How can liberals be expected to embrace compromise and moderation when there is no one left to compromise with? This view -- along with the nagging suspicion that the failure to offer a robust liberal alternative to modern conservatism has resulted in the pronounced rightward shift of American politics in recent decades -- has led many liberals to conclude that they have no choice but to attempt to beat conservatives at their own game.

The strategy has been dangerously misguided. Extreme polarization has served conservatives very well, driving moderate leaders from politics, promoting feelings of cynicism, inefficacy, and distrust among the public, and forcing Democrats to spend huge sums of money on canvassing, texting, social media, and celebrity appeals in order to turn out moderates, young people, and minorities on election day. Less clear is how America's escalating ideological arms race will conceivably serve liberals. Instead of going to war against the Right, liberals will better serve their social and political objectives by waging a war on polarization.

#### There’s nothing wrong with changing one’s mind on significant issues.

Bradshaw 12 — William B. Bradshaw, former minister and English teacher, holds a Ph.D. in Demonology from the University of St. Andrews (Scotland), 2012 (“Politicians and Flip-Flopping,” *The Huffington Post*, September 4th, Available Online at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-b-bradshaw/politicians-and-flipflopp_b_1853991.html>, Accessed 07-26-2016)

It’s easy for opinionated people to call something a flip-flop when it is not really that at all—when it is an honest, deep-felt and carefully thought-out change of mind. It’s all right for people—voters and candidates—to change their minds about how they view very significant issues. In fact, I recommend our not being old “stick in the muds” who cling to the past—personally, professionally, politically, nationally, and internationally—regardless of the issues or the circumstances.

I am not suggesting that we should give up our heartfelt beliefs just for the sake of change. What I am recommending is that we all should open our eyes and minds to new ideas, making certain that, whatever our views are, we are on the right track—especially during this election time. These are very difficult times for all parts of the world, and this is a very significant election. It is important for all voters—for you—to make a very rational and informed decision about whom you are going to vote for and why.

### Information Overload

#### Simulating information overload best prepares students to cope — most valuable skill.

Head and Eisenberg 11 — Alison J. Head, Co-Director and Co-Principal Investigator of Project Information Literacy—a large-scale study about early adults and their research habits, Research Scientist in the Information School at the University of Washington, Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society and the Library Innovation Lab at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Library and Information Science from the University of California-Berkeley, and Michael B. Eisenberg, Co-Director and Co-Principal Investigator of Project Information Literacy—a large-scale study about early adults and their research habits, Dean Emeritus and Professor in the Information School at the University of Washington, holds a Ph.D. in Information Transfer from the School of Information at Syracuse University, 2011 (“College students eager to learn but need help negotiating information overload,” Seattle Times, June 3rd, Available Online at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2015227485\_guest05head.html, Accessed 09-07-2011)

All is not lost! Most of the students we studied across all types of higher-education institutions in the U.S. still attend college to learn, but many are afraid of getting lost in a thicket of information overload they cannot dodge.

Our research tells us information literacy is a critical component of the larger concerns facing higher-education institutions today, along with challenges of multiculturalism, massive budget cuts, helicopter parents, grade inflation, limitations of K-12 education and preparation for college, and adapting to an ever-changing information-technology landscape.

Since 2008, we have been studying the information-literacy skills of students — the ability to recognize when information is needed, then locate, evaluate and put that information to effective use. As information scientists, we believe these skills are essential to critical thinking, lifelong learning and succeeding in life, the work force and in a democratic society.

We surveyed and interviewed more than 10,000 U.S. students at 31 U.S. colleges and universities, including undergraduates enrolled at UW, Harvard, Ohio State University, University of Michigan and community colleges, such as Shoreline Community College. We found no matter where students are enrolled, no matter what information resources they have at their disposal, and no matter how much time they have, the abundance of information technology and the proliferation of digital information resources have made research uniquely paradoxical.

Information is now as infinite as the universe, but finding the answers needed is harder than ever.

Our ongoing research confirms proficiency in information problem solving is urgent, given the dauntingly vast and complex wilderness of information available digitally. As one student in humanities said during one of our focus groups, "What's so frustrating to me about conducting research is the more you know, the more you realize how little you know — it's depressing, frustrating and suffocating."

#### Coping with information overload is vital in every profession.

Head and Eisenberg 11 — Alison J. Head, Co-Director and Co-Principal Investigator of Project Information Literacy—a large-scale study about early adults and their research habits, Research Scientist in the Information School at the University of Washington, Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society and the Library Innovation Lab at Harvard University, holds a Ph.D. in Library and Information Science from the University of California-Berkeley, and Michael B. Eisenberg, Co-Director and Co-Principal Investigator of Project Information Literacy—a large-scale study about early adults and their research habits, Dean Emeritus and Professor in the Information School at the University of Washington, holds a Ph.D. in Information Transfer from the School of Information at Syracuse University, 2011 (“College students eager to learn but need help negotiating information overload,” *Seattle Times*, June 3rd, Available Online at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2015227485\_guest05head.html, Accessed 09-07-2011)

We argue evaluation, interpretation and synthesis are the key competencies of the 21st century. These information-literacy skills allow us to find what we need, filter out what we do not and chart a course in an ever-expanding frontier of information. Information literacy is the essential skill set that cuts across all disciplines and professions.

It is time for many educators to stop lamenting about "these kids today" and retool and prioritize the learning of skills for solving information problems if students are to learn and master critical thinking at all. Or, as one student in social sciences we interviewed told us, "College is about knowing how to look at a problem in multiple ways and how to think about it analytically — now, that's something I'll use in my life."

#### Reducing cognitive overload facilitates deeper engagement with opposing arguments — studies prove.

Kuhn and Udell 7 — Deanna Kuhn, Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University, and Wadiya Udell, Assistant Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington-Bothell, 2007 (“Coordinating own and other perspectives in argument,” *Thinking & Reasoning*, Volume 13, Issue 2, Available Online at http://www.educationforthinking.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07-02%20Coordinating%20Own%20and%20Other%20Perspectives%20in%20Argument.pdf, Accessed 07-15-2012, p. 91-92)

The two forms of development can be predicted to reinforce one another. Progress in use of discourse strategies is propelled by a better understanding of discourse goals. At the same time, exercise of these strategies in discourse promotes more refined understanding of the goals of argumentive discourse. Several recent studies (Felton, 2004; Felton &Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003) provide evidence indicating that younger and less skilled arguers concentrate argumentive discourse on arguments that support their own position, paying relatively little attention to the claims and arguments of their opponent. It is as if they understand the objective of argumentive discourse to be no more than presenting the most compelling case possible as to the merits of one’s position: If I do this better than my opponent, the arguer believes, my position will prevail and my opponent’s position will simply fade away, without my ever having had to address it. The novice arguer thus fails to embrace the dual objectives of argumentive discourse—to identify weaknesses in the opponent’s arguments and to secure commitments from the opponent that can be used to support one’s own claims (Walton, 1989). Both of these, as we have noted, require attention to the opponent’s assertions and the use of strategies to influence them.

Are less skilled arguers really unaware of the relevance of the other’s claims to the discourse task? An alternative hypothesis is that they do [end page 91] possess some such awareness. However, the discourse context in which they must construct and express relevant justifications for the position to which they have committed themselves, while at the same time negotiating the social conventions of discourse, is sufficiently demanding to create cognitive overload if they were at the same time to attempt to attend to the other’s ideas.

If this explanation is correct, reduction of the cognitive demands created by the discourse context should produce a setting in which individuals are more inclined to appreciate the relevance of noting and arguing against the other’s claims, rather than focusing solely on one’s own claims and the arguments in support of them, as we have observed them to do in argumentive discourse (Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). In the studies presented here, we in fact eliminate the actual discourse context entirely, reducing the situation to the statement of two opposing claims, with all other cognitive complexity and response demands minimised. In other words, employing a subtractive logic, by removing discourse from the situation, we seek to isolate and better identify the specifically cognitive demands that contribute to the challenge that argumentive discourse poses, and thereby better understand that challenge. We compare performance across the age range from middle childhood through early adulthood, the period during which the earlier argument research has suggested the relevant skills are developing (Felton& Kuhn, 2001). The specific question we begin with in Study 1 is whether there exist developmental differences in preference for arguments that undertake to strengthen one’s own position versus ones that undertake to weaken the opponent’s position.

#### Engaging in opponents’ arguments is essential to effective critical thinking and decision-making. This is a practical, everyday skill.

Kuhn and Udell 7 — Deanna Kuhn, Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University, and Wadiya Udell, Assistant Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington-Bothell, 2007 (“Coordinating own and other perspectives in argument,” *Thinking & Reasoning*, Volume 13, Issue 2, Available Online at http://www.educationforthinking.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07-02%20Coordinating%20Own%20and%20Other%20Perspectives%20in%20Argument.pdf, Accessed 07-15-2012, p. 90-91)

The ability to appreciate and engage in sound argument is central to what educators refer to as critical thinking and is essential to skilled decision making (Byrnes, 1998; Klaczynski, 2004). It is among the most widely valued educational objectives for students of middle-school age and beyond. Educators frequently lament students’ weaknesses in producing both oral and written arguments, and considerable research exists documenting such weaknesses (Brem & Rips, 2000; Keating, 2004; Keefer,Zeitz, & Resnick, 2000; Klaczynski, 2000; Knudson, 1992; Kuhn, 1991;Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997; Moshman, 1998; Orsolini, 1993; Perkins,1985; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993; Voss, 2001; Voss & Means, 1991;Weinstock, Newman, & Tabak, 2004). Argument, however, can be both product and process. An individual constructs an argument to support a claim. The dialogic process in which two or more people engage in debate of opposing claims can be referred to as argumentation or argumentive discourse to distinguish it from argument as product. Most of the empirical [end page 90] research on argument has been devoted to argument as product. Yet it is argumentive discourse that figures more importantly in the everyday contexts of most people’s lives. People’s skill in this respect very often has important practical implications. Yet we know relatively little about the nature of these discourse skills and what is entailed in their development.

The skills involved in argumentive discourse appear to be complex. At the same time that one is processing and evaluating input from the conversational partner, one must be formulating an effective response that meets discourse goals. According to Walton (1989), skilled argumentation has two goals. One is to secure commitments from the opponent that can be used to support one’s own argument. The other is to undermine the opponent’s position by identifying and challenging weaknesses in his or her argument. Both of these goals, note, require attention to the opponent’s position and claims.

Drawing on Walton’s analysis, Felton and Kuhn (2001) identify two potential forms of development in argumentive discourse skills. One is enhanced understanding of discourse goals, and the other is application of effective strategies to meet these goals. Strategies, in turn, can be divided into two major categories—those addressed to construction and exposition of one’s own argument and those addressed to the opponent’s position and claims (including securing commitments from the opponent).

#### Students *can* engage opposing arguments — creating incentives for them to do so is key.

Kuhn and Udell 7 — Deanna Kuhn, Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University, and Wadiya Udell, Assistant Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington-Bothell, 2007 (“Coordinating own and other perspectives in argument,” *Thinking & Reasoning*, Volume 13, Issue 2, Available Online at http://www.educationforthinking.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07-02%20Coordinating%20Own%20and%20Other%20Perspectives%20in%20Argument.pdf, Accessed 07-15-2012, p. 101-102)

In the present context, we see in addition the more specific importance of epistemological understanding in the need to recognise the relevance of the other’s position. Young adolescents, we saw, are able to attend to the other’s position, and even to generate an argument against it, when explicitly asked [end page 101] to do so. Yet they infrequently choose the option of attending to that position when this option is offered, and they infrequently include attention to it in their own freely constructed arguments. The challenge in this case, then, is less one of executing the skill (of addressing the opposing position) than it is one of recognising the need to do so. This recognition goes to the very heart of argument. If the opponent’s position is not relevant, the process through which one achieves victory over the opponent cannot be regarded as one of argument.

#### Introducing multiple initial positions facilitates productive interactions that sharpen negotiation skills and boost critical thinking.

Bradshaw and Lowenstein 3 — Martha J. Bradshaw, Professor and Interim Dean at the Louise Herrington School of Nursing at Baylor University, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Texas-Austin, and Arlene J. Lowenstein, Professor of Practice, Nursing, and Director of the CAGS Health Professions Program at Simons School of Nursing and Health Sciences, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh, 2003 (“Debate as a Teaching Strategy,” Fuszard’s Innovative Teaching Strategies in Nursing, Edited by Arlene J. Lowenstein and Martha J. Bradshaw, Published by Jones and Bartlett Publishers, ISBN 0763715514, p. 165)

Debate is a strategy that promotes student interaction and involvement in course topics. There are many advantages to using this strategy. Debate expands the student’s perspective on a given issue, creates doubt about the existence of one clear answer, and requires much thought and further evidence before deriving a solution. Debate also increases awareness of opposing viewpoints. As an interactive strategy, debate develops techniques of persuasion, serves as a means by which students confront a controversial issue, and promotes collaborative efforts and negotiation skills among peers. This strategy promotes independence and participation in the decision-making process, as well as enhancing writing and organizational skills. Debate allows for examination of broad issues that influence professional practice. Critical thinking is enhanced by the scrutiny of more than one position on the issue. Debate allows the student a wider forum than writing a paper and may give a greater sense of accomplishment.9

### Pedagogy of Paradox

#### Forcing students to cope with contradictions is valuable. The pedagogy of paradox increases critical thinking and reflexive learning.

Lewis and Dehler 2k — Marianne W. Lewis, Associate Professor of Management at the University of Cincinnati, and Gordon E. Dehler, Associate Professor of Management at the University of Dayton, 2000 (“Learning through Paradox: A Pedagogical Strategy for Exploring Contradictions and Complexity,” Journal of Management Education, Volume 24, Number 6, December, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 709-710)

Writing in the context of diversity, Gallos (1997) referred to the “power of paradox and contradiction,” contending that a “missing ingredient” in teaching about diversity is “paradox work,” and that effective (diversity) “teaching requires a strong pedagogy of paradox [italics added]—methods to engage the incongruities and contradictions of the work itself” (pp. 152-153). As management educators, our charge is to “teach others to embrace paradox” (p. 153). This challenge, of course, extends beyond the realm of diversity education into the broader arena of management education. For paradox is not only endemic to organizations and management, it may also provide a “lens through which we can learn” (Palmer, 1998, p. 66).

This premise is certainly not new, as paradox has long been linked to learning. Philosophers from ancient Greeks to Taoists to Existentialists have viewed human existence as inherently paradoxical. Lao-tzu (Barrett, 1998), for instance, instructed his students that “all behavior consists of opposites . . . . Learn to see things backward, inside out, and upside down” (p. 18). Similarly, Kierkegaard praised paradox for providing a space for learning, inspiring his insights into the dualities of human nature—love/hate, birth/death, self/other. In his classic study of creativity, Rothenberg (1979) claimed that great scientists and artists share a capacity for paradoxical thinking, an ability to explore this space and shift from either/or toward both/and understandings that make sense of opposites and their interplay. For example, [end page 709] Mozart and Beethoven explored tensions between harmony and discord for inspiration, and Einstein forever altered perceptions of physics by envisioning a man falling off a building at rest relative to things falling beside him and moving relative to sights he passed on the way down.

As “it’s a paradox” becomes the management cliché of our time (Handy, 1994), how can management educators help students develop a capacity for paradoxical thinking? How can we enable students to become comfortable with tensions, view contradictions in a new light, and find truths and rationality in the seemingly absurd? Thinking paradoxically requires working through paradox by exploring conflicting feelings, practices, and perspectives in search of more encompassing understandings. Rarely, however, is there any elaboration of what is meant by “working through” (Smith & Berg, 1987, p. 207). Due greatly to the limitations of written language, most work on paradox resorts to mere telling about paradox. Yet, the classroom offers an opportunity to help students experience paradox and learn to recognize, transcend, and manage contradictions, expanding notions of management from prediction, planning, and control toward more critical, reflective, and complicated understandings.

In this article, we propose learning through paradox as a pedagogical strategy for exploring contradictions and complexity. We begin by describing elements of paradox and by modeling their roles in the learning process. We then suggest three approaches aimed at helping students expand conceptual polarities, recognize their personal contradictions, and manage paradoxical predicaments. Last, we highlight that “paradoxes are paradoxical” (Cameron & Quinn, 1988, p. 13). This strategy requires educators to intentionally generate some degree of uncertainty and confusion, using paradoxical contradictions to foster creative tension while simultaneously maintaining a level of comfort and order that enables students to explore and learn.

#### The process of writing challenges us to work through contradictions.

Gardner 9 — Janet E. Gardner, Associate Professor of English at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, 2009 (“Introduction: Writing About Literature,” *Writing about Literature with 2009 MLA Update: A Portable Guide*, Published by Macmillan, ISBN 0312607571, p. 1)

Writing about literature also has real-world usefulness. By forcing us to organize our thoughts and state clearly what we think, writing an essay helps us to clarify what we know and believe. It gives us a chance to affect the thinking of our readers. Even more important, we actually learn as we write. In the process of writing, we often make new discoveries and forge new connections between ideas. We find and work through contradictions in our thinking, and we create whole new lines of thought as we work to make linear sense out of an often chaotic jumble of impressions. So, while *reading* literature can teach us much about the world, *writing* about literature often teaches us about ourselves.

#### The interplay of arguments produces *better conclusions* than individual reflection.

Waldron 99 — Jeremy Waldron, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law and Philosophy at Columbia University, holds a D.Phil. from the University of Oxford, 1999 (“Between Rights and Bills of Rights,” *Law and Disagreement*, Published by Clarendon Press Oxford, ISBN 0198262132, p. 227)

Such fallibilism can be taken in a purely Cartesian spirit: a solitary thinker's openness to his own revisions, self-criticisms, and reformulations. For most of us, however, it is an aspect of the way we do philosophy together, as members of a community of thinkers and critics. We accept and embrace the circumstance of a plurality of views and the trenchant disagreements they give rise to. Again, the discipline thrives on this. The interplay of arguments is expected to produce better theories that will form the basis for an even more vigorous debate, and so on. In these debates, each of us has a responsibility to take the perspective of the philosophical community from time to time, as well as the perspective of the particular view he is defending. From the latter perspective, one is a passionate partisan of a theory. From the former perspective, however, one knows that it is wrong to expect any particular theory, no matter how attractive or well argued, to survive the process of debate unscathed. One recognizes that debate has a point: collective interaction as a way of reaching towards complicated truth. Simple truths, self-evident truths may form in single minds, but complicated truths (in which category I include all propositions about individual rights) emerge, in Mill's words, only 'by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners'.43

#### Individual reflection doesn’t sufficiently challenge arguments.

Johnson et al. 6 — David W. Johnson, Emeritus Professor of Educational Psychology and Co-Director of the Cooperative Learning Center at the University of Minnesota, recipient of the Distinguished Contributions to Research in Education Award from the American Education Research Association, holds an Ed.D. in Social Psychology from the Teachers College at Columbia University, et al., with Roger T. Johnson, Professor of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Minnesota, Dean Tjosvold, Henry Y. W. Fong Chair Professor in the Management Department and Academic Dean of Business at Lingnan University in Hong Kong, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota, 2006 (“Constructive Controversy: The Value of Intellectual Opposition,” *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Edited by Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman, and Eric C. Marcus, Published by John Wiley & Sons, ISBN 1118046900, p. 74-75)

In individualistic situations, individuals study both sides of the issue but make no oral statements, their conclusions are never challenged, and so [end page 75] their study tends to confirm what they initially thought. Low achievement tends to result. The absence of interpersonal interaction results in neutral relationships and no advances in psychological health.

#### The *process* of debate constructs new knowledge and changes opinions.

Johnson et al. 6 — David W. Johnson, Emeritus Professor of Educational Psychology and Co-Director of the Cooperative Learning Center at the University of Minnesota, recipient of the Distinguished Contributions to Research in Education Award from the American Education Research Association, holds an Ed.D. in Social Psychology from the Teachers College at Columbia University, et al., with Roger T. Johnson, Professor of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Minnesota, Dean Tjosvold, Henry Y. W. Fong Chair Professor in the Management Department and Academic Dean of Business at Lingnan University in Hong Kong, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota, 2006 (“Constructive Controversy: The Value of Intellectual Opposition,” *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Edited by Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman, and Eric C. Marcus, Published by John Wiley & Sons, ISBN 1118046900, p. 80)

Open-minded consideration of all points of view is critical for deriving well-reasoned decisions that integrate the best information and thought from a variety of positions. Participants should open-mindedly believe that opposing positions are based on legitimate information and logic that, if fully understood, will lead to creative solutions that benefit everyone. Involvement in a controversy tends to result in attitude and position change. Participants in a controversy tend to reevaluate their attitudes about the issue and incorporate opponent's arguments into their own attitudes. Participating in a controversy tends to result in attitude change beyond what occurs when individuals read about the issue, and these attitude changes tend to be relatively stable over time (that is, not merely a response to the controversy experience itself).

#### The introduction of contradictory perspectives into problem environments improves content learning and knowledge transfer.

Dolmans and Schmidt 10 — Diana Dolmans, Professor of Innovative Learning Arrangements at Maastricht University (Netherlands), Educational Director of the Interuniversity Centre for Educational Research, holds a Ph.D. in Education Sciences from Maastricht University, and Henk Schmidt, Professor and Chairman of the Institute for Psychology and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Erasmus University (Netherlands), holds a Ph.D. in Psychology from Maastricht University, 2010 (“The Problem-Based Learning Process,” *Lessons from Problem-based Learning*, Edited By Henk van Berkel, Albert Scherpbier, Harry Hillen, and Cees van der Vleuten, Published by Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199583447, p. 16)

Contextual Learning

The context or situation in which knowledge is acquired determines whether and how it is used. All too often it is difficult for students to transfer what they have learned in one context to new situations or different contexts. The reason for this is that students fail to discern that a similar deep structure underlies situations that, on the surface, may appear to be very dissimilar. As a consequence, knowledge transfers less easily across different types of situations (Billet, 1996). Transfer can be defined as applying what one has learned in different situations (Mayer, 2004). It can be facilitated by anchoring learning in meaningful contexts, revisiting content at different times, in rearranged contexts, for different purposes, and from different perspectives (Ertmer & Newby, 1993). Furthermore, when students are encouraged to view problem environments from multiple perspectives, they learn to recognize the critical features of the cases presented to them (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999). In conclusion, learners are preferably exposed to a professionally relevant context and confronted with cases or problems from multiple perspectives and in multiple contexts, because this stimulated the transfer of knowledge. In PBL, students are confronted with problems often highly relevant for their future professional practice (Dolmans et al., 1997).

\* PBL = Problem-Based Learning

### Mixed Scanning

#### Analysts should engage in mixed scanning. After considering a few initial options, one surviving alternative is ultimately selected.

Etzioni 86 — Amitai Etzioni, University Professor and Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, 1986 (“Mixed Scanning Revisited,” *Public Administration Review*, Volume 46, Number 1, January-February, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 9) [language modified using strikethrough and brackets]

Janis and Mann (1977, p. 37) introduced a major improvement of the program. They point out that while in the initial scanning, all those options that have no “~~crippling~~ [disqualifying] objections” are held over for closer scanning, which amounts to a “quasi-satisficing” approach, “each time the surviving alternatives are reexamined, the testing rule might be changed in the optimizing direction by raising the minimum standard (from crippling objections to more minor objections).”

#### Mixed scanning is the best model for decision-making.

Etzioni 67 — Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, 1967 (“Mixed Scanning: A ‘Third’ Approach To Decision-Making,” *Public Administration Review*, Volume 27, Number 5, December, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 389-390)

In the exploration of mixed-scanning, it is essential to differentiate fundamental decisions from incremental ones. Fundamental decisions are made by exploring the main alternatives the actor sees in view of his conception of his goals, but—unlike what rationalism [end page 389] would indicate—details and specifications are omitted so that an overview is feasible. Incremental decisions are made but within the contexts set by fundamental decisions (and fundamental reviews). Thus, each of the two elements in mixed-scanning help to reduce the effects of the particular shortcomings of the other; incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions, and contextuating rationalism helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run alternatives. Together. empirical tests and comparative study of decision-makers would show that these elements make for a third approach which is at once more realistic and more effective than its components.

#### The chess analogy proves that mixed scanning is effective.

Etzioni 86 — Amitai Etzioni, University Professor and Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies at George Washington University, 1986 (“Mixed Scanning Revisited,” *Public Administration Review*, Volume 46, Number 1, January-February, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 8-9)

Mixed scanning is a hierarchical mode of decision making (Goldberg, 1975, p. 934) that combines higher order, fundamental decision making with lower order, incremental decisions that work out and/or prepare for the higher order ones. The term scanning is used to refer to search, collection, processing, and evaluation of information as well as to the drawing of conclusions, all elements in the service of decision making. Mixed scanning also contains rules for allocation of resources among the levels of decision making and for evaluation, leading to changes in the proportion of higher versus lower levels of scanning based on changes in the situation.

For example, chess players, unable to review all the options (Haynes, 1974, pp. 7-8) and seeking to do better than merely think one or two steps ahead, running from trouble or toward a seeming opportunity, divide their time and psychic energy between first deciding among fundamental approaches (“ready to attack" vs. “need to further develop the forces": “attack on the queen, or king, side”) and then examining in detail options only within the chosen approach. (In effect, this form of scanning may take place on more than two levels; e.g., choosing a major strategy, a substrategy, and then examining in detail some options within that sub-strategy.) Rules for allocation are illustrated in chess when the game must be completed within a given time period, Players will then engage in less higher-level scanning, i.e., allot it less time, as the game progresses, although it may be granted “extra” time if the strategy followed runs into difficulties.

This approach is less demanding than the full search of all options that rationalism requires, and more “strategic” and innovative than incrementalism. It was suggested in the 1967 publication that it is both empirically supported, in that the most effective decision makers are expected to use mixed scanning, and the most suitable, i.e., normative correct, approach.

Mixed scanning, it was suggested in the original publication, is akin to scanning by satellites with two lenses: wide and zoom. Instead of taking a close look at all formations, a prohibitive task, or only at the spots of previous trouble, the wide lenses provide clues as to places to zoom in, looking for details. In the years that passed a new technology was developed which applies the “double-lens" approach of mixed scanning, Decision Information Discipline System (DIDS). The system provides computer graphic displays of geodata, usually in the form of a map. The system has a zoom capacity that allows its users to zero in instantaneously on sub-units (or subsets of variables), for example states within the USA and counties within the states, Wallace (1983) studied the 10 uses of the system as instances of mixed scanning. In one case a wide scan established that some areas were losing population although they were in parts of the county that by general trends should have been experiencing population growth. The zoom revealed these to be places in which military bases were being closed. In four, possibly five, of the 10 cases the approach led to what Wallace calls “unexpected” findings [end page 8] (p. 318). The broad scanning was more economical than detailed (zoom-in) scanning of all counties. At the same time, the zoom-in scanning of counties, singled out by the broad scanning, prevented the loss of information that would have ensued if only broad scanning would have taken place.

#### It’s good to consider multiple options — even those the advocate personally disagrees with.

Patton and Sawicki 12 — Carl V. Patton, Dean of the School of Architecture and Urban Planning and Professor in the Departments of Architecture and Urban Planning at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California-Berkeley, and David S. Sawicki, Professor of City Planning and Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology, holds a Ph.D. in Urban and Regional Planning from Cornell University, 2012 (“The Need for Simple Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning,” *Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning*, Edited by Carl Patton, David Sawicki, and Jennifer Clark, Published by Routledge (First Edition 1986), ISBN 0137495099, Available Online at <https://msu.edu/course/prr/389/Pattonsawicki.doc>, Accessed 07-26-2016)

7. Learn to Advocate the Positions of Others: There are three principal reasons that taking a position different from your own can be beneficial. This is not to suggest that analysts should be amoral. Rather, your willingness to advocate other sides of the issue can have several positive results. (1) It can raise the level of debate, bringing out the merits of both sides and displaying the problem and alternative solutions in all their complexity. This can help lead to compromises, where if left as simple arguments or arguments based on clashing values alone, the problems may remain irresolvable. (2) This approach can improve your analytical skills and your facility with unfamiliar subject material, in the process perhaps causing you to reexamine what you have considered to be established truths. (3) This approach can also strengthen the tradition of an advocacy process where a strong challenge to an established policy — even a good policy — can result in a better policy. Competitive or advocacy processes are built into some of our most important institutions: the courts, the Congress, and free enterprise. These systems rely on conflict in order to function, and their achievements would be far fewer if they had to wait for consensus or had vested a single entity with the responsibility to take a comprehensive view.

Analysts should take the opportunity to learn from lawyers, whose professional training teaches them to assume either side and to play within the rules of the legal and political process. Learn to make up for a lack of substantive knowledge — in housing, health, environment, transportation, land use — by substituting an efficient learning process. Like lawyers, students of policy analysis need to be able to develop a case from any perspective and with limited prior substantive knowledge of the problem area. Policy analysts need to know how to learn efficiently about substantive problem areas because most analysts will encounter problems that shift during their lifetime, if not daily.